

Towards a Model of Factors Affecting Resistance to Using Multi-Method Authentication Systems in Higher-Education Environments



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ABSTRACT: *Over the course of history, different means of object as well as person identification and verification have evolved for user authentication. In recent years, a new concern has emerged regarding the accuracy of authentication and of protection of personal identifying information (PII), because previous information systems (IS) misuses have resulted in significant financial loss. Such losses have escalated more noticeably because of identity-theft incidents due to breaches of PII within multiple public-access environments, such as institutions of higher-education. Although the use of various biometric and radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies is expanding, resistance to using these technologies remains an issue. As such, in this research-in-progress paper, we outline a predictive study to assess the contribution of campus students' perceptions of the importance of protecting their PII, noted as Perceived Value of Organizational Protection of PII (PVOP), authentication complexity (AC), and invasion of privacy (IOP) on their resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in higher-education environments. In this work-in-progress study, we seek to better understand the theoretical foundations for the effect of students' perceptions on their resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in higher-education environments and uncover key constructs that may significantly contribute to such resistance. A quasi-experiment is proposed including clearly identified procedures and data analyses.*

Keywords: Authentication on-campus, Students' Resistance to Biometrics, Identity Theft, Biometric Measures on-campus, IT Complexity on-campus

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1. Introduction

Recent research suggested that electronic-commerce (e-commerce) transactions are not the primary source of identity theft (Collins, 2003; Newman, 2004). However, Shareef, Kamur, and Vinod (2012) proposed that identity theft plays a substantial role in purchase resistance for consumers of e-commerce. Increasing demands to prevent identity theft are advocated in recent literature, newspapers, and government policies. According to Shareef et al. (2012), “current research addresses the issues of identity theft; source, type, and preventative measuring tools” (p. 30). Additional studies indicated that inadequate user authentication (UA) methods are a contributing factor for identity theft (Fichtman, 2001). A national survey conducted by

the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (2008) revealed that 4.7% of American adults experienced identity theft that involved the loss of personal identifying information (PII), while such numbers appear to grow rapidly every year. Industry responses to combat the aspects of identity theft are focused on the verifiable identification of individuals through the development of acceptable multi-method authentication systems (Bellah, 2001). While current research has shown significant advances in biometric recognition, users continue to resist using biometric technology to enhance password security including in institutions of higher-education (Levy & Ramim, 2009). This resistance is attributed to concerns related to protecting their PII, invasion of privacy (IOP), and authentication complexity (AC).

It appears that a need exists to better understand the problem with identity theft escalation as a result of users sharing, reusing, and losing passwords, as well as the mishandling of PII during e-commerce transactions also in the context of institutions of higher-education (Furnell, Dowland, Illingworth, & Reynolds, 2000). This has resulted in significant losses from illegal authentication and theft of PII. Efforts to combat the weaknesses in current methods of username/password entries have influenced the development of biometric forms of identification (Altinkemer & Wang, 2011). However, single-authentication biometrics still exhibit misreads and susceptibility to spoofing vulnerability, so organizations have turned to testing multi-method authentication systems for user authentication (Gunson, Marshall, Morton, & Jack, 2010). Increased monetary losses occurring due to privacy attacks during e-commerce activities within organizations have swayed individuals' perceptions of the importance of protecting PII (PVOP), lessened their use of Internet purchasing, and could influence their resistance to new authentication methods (Dowling & Staelin, 1995; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Presently, many of the charges for tuition, books, dormitories, meal plans, trips, and other activities both on-campus as well as off-campus are conducted over the Internet or via kiosks throughout their campus. As a result of these increasing demands, institutions of higher-education are implementing chip-based student IDs that can incorporate the student biometric characteristics. However, little is known about the various factors affecting resistance to using multi-method authentication systems in higher-education environments. As such, this work-in-progress research is aimed at proposing a model to validate empirically the contribution of the constructs of PVOP, IOP, and AC on individual's resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in higher-education environments.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1 Perceived Value of Organizational Protection of Personal Identifying Information

According to Dowling and Staelin (1994) as well as Mayer et al. (1995), the PVOP of PII is demonstrated by the elevated concerns of IOP resulting from financial losses occurring from identity theft. These losses are increasing due to individuals exhibiting unsafe password behaviors such as reusing and sharing passwords, as well as the lack of awareness of the costs associated with PII theft (Eisenstein, 2008; Furnell, 2008; Kumar, Mohan, & Holowczak, 2008; Levy, 2008). Users are unaware that illegal access to PII enables unauthorized access to use, copy, release, destroy, deny, or gain access to create imposter accounts (Furnell, 2008; O'Brien, 2002; Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Shaw et al., 2008).

According to Eisenstein (2008), PII loss stems from a variety of causes, resulting in significant financial loss. These occurrences include merchant failures to protect client data under their personal control, stolen mail, computer data breaches; illegally reproduced pay sites such as PayPal©, viruses, and phishing scams (Furnell, 2008; Kumar, 2008; Shaw et al., 2008). Furnell (2008) identified users as a) those informed of areas of identity theft risk and are doing something to protect themselves, as opposed to b) those who remain indifferent to the seriousness of the loss of PII.

2.2 Invasion of Privacy

According to Karyda and Gritzalis (2009), privacy can generally be defined as "*the individual's ability to control the terms by which their [sic] personal information is collected and used*" (p. 195). Thus, the prevention of IOP could represent protection or freedom from interference by others (Gritzalis, 2004). The concept of acknowledging an individual's right to privacy includes the factors of necessity, finality, transparency, and proportionality (Karyda & Gritzalis, 2009).

Furthermore, privacy crusader Alan Westin defined privacy as "*the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves, when, where, how, and to what extent information about themselves is communicated to others*" (Hough, 2009, p.7). However, Westin's contemporary, David Flaherty, separated privacy further into four sections. His four sections are comprised of:

Solitude: The perfect and unblemished state of privacy whereby you can easily restrict access to yourself from others by

withdrawing your presence.

Intimacy: This is a by membership only and groups protect their members.

Anonymity: This is a form of being “*off the grid*” in that you are able to protect yourself from ongoing public recognition or involvement.

Reserve: This is the measure of trust that one places in others not to disclose specific information about oneself, such as what, where, when, and how (Hough, 2009).

2.3 Authentication Complexity

Furnell et al. (2004) reported on a study of alternative authentication methods. Their study identified infrastructures as trying to cope with the increasing number of password-protected systems. Adding to the growing burden are Websites, resulting in the ever-increasing occurrences of reuse and sharing of password-sensitive authentications. Regardless, security personnel still prefer password and personal identification number (PIN) usage as trade-offs, as the number of imposters and false alarm rates are still high. Thus, the responsibility of memorizing, not sharing, multitudes of passwords, and not sharing any with others is not easy, due to their inconvenience. Such issue can result in significant security breaches of PII and in identity theft. Sasse et al. (2001) conducted a study that indicated that with PINs being more difficult for customers to remember than passwords, individuals are resorting back to using date of birth or writing information on paper.

Furthermore, Furnell et al. (2004) identified UA methods that provide lowered identity theft occurrences as single-factor authentications, based on something that the user knows (e.g. passwords or PIN), possesses (smart card, token, or RFID device), or is (e.g. a biometric characteristics like fingerprints, eye retina, face, voice, etc.). Multi-factor authentication can be based on any two of these methods combined (Levy & Ramim, 2009; O’Gorman, 2003). Furthermore, Murdoch, Drimer, Anderson, and Bond (2010) conducted a study that showed that strengths in multi-factor authentication systems indicated a remarkable decline in fraud following a compulsory usage requirement after implementation. This decline is significant in that other online banking fraud rose by 55% during the same time period (Gunson et al., 2010). As a result of increased fraud leading to identity theft, two-factor authentication use is increasing in the UK within outside vendor use. However, the fraud rate with single-factor authentication, within known banking entities, remains unaffected (Gunson et al., 2010).

2.4 Mixed-Method Authentication Systems

With increasing demands being placed on the financial service industries, enhanced means of protecting PII through added security measures is being investigated (Hiltgen et al., 2006). According to Weir et al. (2009), mixed methods of identification are referred to as multi-method, or two-factor, authentication, versus single-factor, and are being tested as well as implemented in varying degrees. Two-factor authentication is comprised of multiple objects such as card readers or tokens represented by ‘*what you have*’, in addition to a multitude of other types of identification. These other authentications refer to passwords/PINs or biometric devices identified as ‘*personal characteristics*.’ Some of these recognized biometric traits are voiceprints, facial features, fingerprints, and gait. Additionally, radio frequency identification is increasingly being used in financial transactions through mobile devices.

According to Coventry, De Angeli, and Johnson (2003), gaining secure access to sensitive areas through possession of held objects, knowledge, or physical characteristics has accelerated significantly through a multitude of consumer devices, services, vehicles, and banking interfaces. However, this expansion of methods to gain authentication has resulted in a battle of supremacy between usability, memorability of passwords, securing of PII, and a consideration of multi-method authentication systems (Adams & Chang, 1993; Adams & Sasse, 1999; Levy & Ramim, 2009; Yan, Blackwell, Anderson, & Grant, 2001). According to De Angeli, Coutts, Coventry, Johnson, Cameron, and Fischer (2002) as well as Dhamija and Perrig (2000), the continual upgrading of mixed methods of password usage impacts the complexity levels of authentication methods. This impact comprises replacing PINs with forms of biometric identification that includes photos and fingerprints (De Angeli, Coutts, Coventry, Johnson, Cameron, & Fischer, 2002; Dhamija, & Perrig, 2000).

2.5 Resistance to using Multi-method authentication systems

Resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) is defined as the reluctance to accept alternative methods of user verification due to perceived security, complexity, and privacy concerns (Bellah, 2001; Van Hoose, 2008). According to Huixian and Liaojun (2009), the challenge of providing “*privacy protection of biometric data has become a common concern of the public*” (p. 295). Therefore, IOP is recognized as a significant influence over the degree of acceptance of biometric-

based authentication. Biometric technologies come with an array of problems that are both technical as well as behavioral (Pons & Polak, 2008). These difficulties include data degradation and variances in data recorded. However, resistance to using is “based on attitudes and behaviors related to user acceptance, trust, habits, etc”. (p. 115). As a result of inconsistent attitudes regarding the concerns over privacy, storage, protection, and the potential loss of PII, the measuring of user resistance is a challenging task. This can be attributed to users exhibiting fear, hesitancy, and discomfort over demands to change from current forms of authentication (Pons & Polak, 2008).

3. Research Problem and Study Goals

This research problem that we seek to address is identity-theft incidents due to breaches of personal identifying information (PII) (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003; Zviran & Erlich, 2006). Such PII breaches are significant threats to invasion of privacy (IOP) during e-commerce activities by users in public-access environments, including higher-education (Venkatesh et al., 2003; Zviran & Erlich, 2006). Kim, Jeong, Kim, and So (2011) identified PII as financial card numbers, usernames, passwords, medical records, driver’s licenses, and Social Security numbers (Kim et al., 2011). These PII represent targets of online theft during e-commerce activities. Doolin, Dillon, Thompson, and Corner (2005) defined e-commerce as information networks that enable data flow for business, capital, and logistical support. Existing methods to protect PII during e-commerce activities are based on three types of authentication: username/password, tokens/smart cards, and biometrics (Levy & Ramim, 2009; Millett & Holden, 2003). According to Venkatesh et al. (2003), resistance to accepting emerging technology is based on the difference between an individual’s nonadoption and his or her acceptance levels. Thus, resistance on the part of individuals may be the cause of significant failures in the implementation of multi-method authentication systems (Robey, Ross, & Boudreau, 2002).

We attempt to achieve six research goals. The first three specific goals are to investigate empirically the contribution of PVOP, IOP, and AC to RMS, respectively, in higher-education environments. The fourth specific goal is to investigate empirically the contribution of the interaction of the three independent variables, PVOP, IOP, and AC on students RMS in higher-education environments. The fifth specific goal is to investigate empirically whether any significant differences of PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS exist based on students’ ages (AGE), gender (GEN), person’s prior experience with identity theft (EXP), and person’s acquaintance experience with identity theft (EXA).

The main research question (RQ) that this study will address is: What is the contribution of PVOP, IOP, AC, and interaction on students’ resistance to using multi-method authentication systems in higher-education environments?

In addressing the main RQ, this proposed study will seek to assess three specific directional propositions and six hypotheses (noted in null form):

- P1:** Perceptions of the importance of protecting PII (PVOP) will have a statistically significant *negative* influence on students’ resistance to using a multi-method authentication system (RMS) in higher-education environments.
- P2:** Invasion of privacy (IOP) will have a statistically significant *positive* influence on students’ resistance to using a multi-method authentication system (RMS) in higher-education environments.
- P3:** Authentication Complexity (AC) will have a statistically significant *positive* influence on students’ resistance to using a multi-method authentication system (RMS) in higher-education environments.
- H4:** There will be no significant interaction effect of *PVOP*, *IOP*, and *AC* on students’ resistance to using a multi-method authentication system (*RMS*) in higher-education environments.
- H5a:** *PVOP*, *IOP*, *AC*, and *RMS* will have no statistically significant difference based on age (*AGE*).
- H5b:** *PVOP*, *IOP*, *AC*, and *RMS* will have no statistically significant difference based on gender (*GEN*).
- H5c:** *PVOP*, *IOP*, *AC*, and *RMS* will have no statistically significant difference based on person’s prior experience with identity theft (*EXP*).
- H5d:** *PVOP*, *IOP*, *AC*, and *RMS* will have no statistically significant difference based on person’s acquaintance experience with identity theft (*EXA*).
- H6:** There will be no statistically significant differences on *PVOP*, *IOP*, *AC*, and *RMS* based on students who used a multi-method authentication system in higher-education environments and those who haven’t.




Figure 1. Proposed Conceptual Map for Predicting RMS in higher-education environments

Figure 1 presents the proposed conceptual map for predicting RMS in higher-education environments.

4. Experimental Research and Methodology

To investigate the effects of introducing multibiometrics for user authentication, a lab experiment will be implemented. Three groups consisting of two experimental and one control will be used (Levy & Ellis, 2011). As indicated above, organizations, both public and private, require secure authentication to their systems to ensure protection of data and certainty as to prevention of privacy intrusion. This research seeks to uncover whether multibiometrics can be accepted as a means of authentication by users without added complexity. Control Group A will consist of approximately 50 participants. Experimental Group B will consist of approximately 50 participants. Control Group C will consist of 50 participants. The experimental study participants will consist of students from a local private university that has various degrees for differing academic levels. All participants in the three groups will be randomly assigned. The experiment is planned over the timeframe of a full term consisting of 11 weeks. To measure the effects of resistance to using multibiometrics for user authentication, a system will be set up whereby all three groups will be asked to log in to the system using a different method for each group. Once logged in, the users will be asked to answer a Web-based survey. The system will track the number of logon attempts for each group. The survey will also ask the participants questions to measure each of the constructs (PVOP, IOP, AC, & RMS), and questions to collect some demographics information needed for the analysis (AGE, GEN, EXP, & EXA).

Following the experimental data collection, a pre-analysis data screening process will be conducted to be certain that the accuracy of data collected doesn't improperly influence validity results (Levy, 2006; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Following that, the data will be analyzed using Partial Least Square (PLS) and a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to address the hypotheses proposed. Moreover, descriptive analysis will be done to provide some statistics about the participants.

5. Conclusions

This work-in-progress study is anticipated to provide greater understanding and contribution to the field of Information Security in the context of higher-education in two significant ways. First, it will investigate the biometric and RFID technologies that affect resistance (RMS) in higher-education environments during e-commerce activities that have been developed to respond to the increasing number of occurrences of identity theft either on-campus or off-campus. Second, it will investigate the primary constructs of PVOP, IOP, and AC contributing to students' RMS, while controlled for age (AGE), gender (GEN), identity theft experience (EXP), and the experience of acquaintance (EXA) in higher-education environments. Thus, the results of this study are anticipated to help in providing recommendations for both the research and use of multibiometrics systems in public access environments. It is the main objective and hope of this study to be able to determine which of the constructs has a significant contribution on RMS.

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